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Institutional Forgetting/Forgetting Institutions: Space and memory in secure 
forensic psychiatric care 
 
Steven D. Brown, University of Leicester 
Paula Reavey, London South Bank University 
 
Institutional Assemblages 
 
‘We know the images’, Michel Foucault says, ‘they are familiar from all histories of 
psychiatry, where their function is to illustrate that happy age when madness was at 
last recognized and treated according to a truth to which everyone had been blind for 
too long’ (2006: 463). He is speaking here of the ‘grand asylums’ that were built from 
the eighteenth century onwards as enormous therapeutic spaces for the containment 
and treatment of significant mental health issues. These new institutions replaced the 
former system, where mental health was conflated with poverty and criminality. 
Psychiatry emerges a distinct discipline in tandem with the construction of these 
novel institutional spaces. Patients admitted to the care provided in these secure 
settings, with their locked doors and fixed regimes, would find the psychological 
space to address their own psychological issues. But often at the cost of their present 
liberty, their immediate future aspirations and often their very identity. 
 
Over the past decade, we have been involved in a number of studies that concern how 
mental health service users experience the spaces they inhabit, both inside and outside 
institutions (see McGrath, Reavey & Brown, 2008; Brown & Tucker, 2010; Brown, 
Reavey, Kanyeredzi & Batty, 2013). An obvious starting point for such work would 
be around thematics of power and ritualisation, as found, for instance, in Erving 
Goffman’s work on institutionalization. Goffman (1991) brilliantly demonstrated how 
patients in asylums were disciplined via the systematic removal of their past identities 
(e.g. through symbolic gestures, such as the removal of personal items and clothing) 
to ensure maximum compliance with hospital procedures. The subjects of Goffman’s 
research become ‘docile bodies’ through their induction into the ‘degradation rituals’ 
of the asylum, separated from the world outside and their former life by the literal and 
symbolic enclosure of space. 
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However, the kinds of institutions that Goffman studied are now historical and 
cultural relics across much of Western Europe and North America. A programme of 
closure of the ‘grand asylums’ gathered pace from 1970s onwards, replaced by a 
system of long term outpatient care in the community, coupled with emergency short-
term inpatient care, usually co-located in general hospital grounds. The problem for 
many mental health service users is typically not that of getting out of secure care, but 
instead of getting into the mental health system at all. Michel Foucault gave us many 
of the conceptual tools to understand how the initial enclosure of mental health or, as 
he puts it, the ‘great confinement’ was enacted, along with its place within the 
generalized ‘penal archipelago’ of the eighteenth and nineteenth century (Foucault, 
1976; 2006)1. We still await the thinker bold enough to give us a similarly far-
reaching account of the decline of the ‘total institution’ of the grand asylum. 
 
In the absence of such a work, we can focus instead on the transformation of the 
‘social topology’ of mental health. The term comes from the joint work of Annemarie 
Mol and John Law (1994). Their longstanding project has been to seek alternative 
descriptions of how spatial and temporal relations are assembled in the domain that 
can be loosely termed ‘the social’2. Drawing upon ideas from topology, Mol & Law 
argue that ‘‘the social’ does not exist as a single spatial type. Rather, it performs 
several kinds of space in which different ‘operations’ take place’ (Mol & Law, 1994: 
643). Social space does not come in one topological form, they claim, despite the 
traditional tendency of social scientists to think in terms of distinct regions and 
boundaries. In Goffman’s work, for instance, the inside space of ‘total institutions’, 
such as psychiatric units or prisons, is closed off from the outside world in a way that 
allows for the control and management of relations between patients/prisoners and 
staff. The social world one finds within the total institution is analytically treated as 																																																								1	It	is	worth	noting	that	Foucault’s	historical	account	of	the	rise	of	the	asylum	is	not	uncontroversial,	although	this	is	perhaps	of	less	interest	than	the	account	of	power	and	subjectivity	to	which	it	gives	rise.		2	This	can	only	be	a	loose	term	since	as	Actor-Network	Theory	(ANT)	has	
demonstrated	in	some	considerable	detail,	there	are	no	firm	distinctions	to	be	
drawn	between	domains	such	as	‘society’,	‘science’,	‘technology’,	‘nature’	etc.	This	
argument	is	most	closely	associated	with	Bruno	Latour’s	work	(e.g.	Latour,	2013;	
2005;	1993).		
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utterly different from that outside. However, Foucault’s study of the social 
architecture of power that emerges in what he calls the ‘disciplinary societies’ of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, shows that the purpose of incarceration, whether 
it be in prisons, hospitals or factories, is not to exclude inmates from broader relations 
(Foucault, 2003; 2007). What these institutions do instead is create new patterns of 
circulation of people, knowledge and capital between institutions. Discipline is a 
distributed system of power for managing movement rather than enclosing and 
holding still3. 
 
Foucault’s work led to a shift away from treating institutions as monolithic spaces of 
control towards a more nuanced account of assembling relations amongst 
heterogeneous sets of materials. This approach, broadly informed by the work of 
Foucault’s contemporary, Gilles Deleuze, views institutions as assemblages (or 
‘agencements’) that perform a work of drawing together (i.e. ‘assembling’, 
‘connecting together’) spatial and temporal relations. Jane Bennett offers a useful 
summary: 
 
Assemblages are ad hoc groupings of diverse elements, of vibrant materials of 
all sorts. Assemblages are living throbbing confederations that are able to 
function despite the persistent presence of energies that confound them from 
within. They have uneven topographies, because some of the points at which 
the various affects and bodies cross paths are more heavily trafficked than 
others, and so power is not distributed equally across its surface. Assemblages 
are not governed by any central head: no one materiality or type of material 
has sufficient competence to determine consistently the trajectory or impact of 
the group. The effects generated by an assemblage are, rather, emergent 
properties, emergent in their ability to make something happen … is distinct 
from the sum of the vital force of each materiality considered along. Each 
member and proto-member of the assemblage has a certain vital force, but 
there is also an effectivity proper to the grouping as such: an agency of the 
assemblage. And precisely because each member-actant maintains an 																																																								3	See	Salter,	2013	for	an	argument	that	relates	Foucault’s	work	to	the	current	
‘mobilities’	paradigm	in	social	science.		
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energetic pulse slightly ‘off’ from that of the assemblage, an assemblage is 
never a stolid block but an open-ended collective, a ‘non-totalizable sum’. An 
assemblage thus not only has a distinctive history of formation but a finite life 
span (2010: 23-24) 
 
We can tease apart the dense set of ideas that are contained here. Instead of asking for 
the formal basis upon which institutions rest (i.e. law, beliefs, cultural conventions), it 
is the heterogeneity of the ‘diverse elements’ that make an assemblage that is of 
interest. Assemblages are gatherings of persons, materials and codes that cohere 
loosely rather than interlock. The elements do not synthesise into some form of 
superordinate or supra-individual entity. Internal differences and tensions remain 
fundamental to how the assemblage operates. Moreover, there is rarely a singular 
regulatory process that governs the assemblage – multiple and contradictory cognitive 
and affective codings are at work simultaneously. As a consequence, relations of 
power and governance within the assemblage are not straightforward. In practice, the 
overarching purpose and goals of the assemblage may not be entirely clear, and may 
instead emerge through its own activity. In this way the historical emergence and 
‘life’ of a given assemblage requires a very singular analysis.  
 
This way of approaching institutions and other forms of social structure has gathered 
pace considerably over the past decade (see DeLanda, 2006; Phillips, 2006; Anderson 
& MacFarlane, 2011). Bu in order to see the virtue in its application to secure forensic 
psychiatric institutions, we will have to rewrite Bennett’s extract a little: 
 
The secure unit is complex and changeable arrangement of medical, legal and 
governmental practices, mixing together nurses, former prisoners, airlock 
doors, depot injections, charts, televisions, plastic cutlery, cigarettes, staff 
rotas, sunlight, and bedrooms littered with belongings. The unit can be a lively 
place, especially during times when patients arrive on transfer from prison, 
where the contradictory demands of care and containment can rub up against 
one another uneasily, notably around issues like personal relationships. The 
space of the unit is difficult to properly gauge, since patients may be allowed 
off the ward into the general hospital grounds and to make community visits; 
there is a distinctly different ‘feel’ to the common areas and the individual 
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bedrooms, reflecting the various kinds of activities that are possible in each. 
Whilst there is a clear management structure, it is difficult to know where 
exactly the unit sits – are we in the prison system, the medical system or 
somewhere else entirely? This partial ambiguity allows for the emergence of 
practices and relationships that are particular to the unit, some of which would 
be difficult to understand if one approached the unit as either purely a space of 
containment or purely a space of treatment. Everyone and everything that 
enters the unit lends something specific, from East African nurses to long-term 
service users to middle-class psychiatrists mixed together in this space; this 
unique confluence of identities and experiences seems integral to how the 
place seems to ‘work’ as whole. Yet precisely because it is such a mixture, the 
unit seems to be rather porous – people, practices and objects seem to be 
displaced, to move through and across the extended space of the unit in 
unpredictable ways. The place has its own history, one that seems to be 
written and rewritten on an almost daily basis.   
 
If Goffman found rituals and practices in ‘total institutions’ designed to divide and 
enclose social space, what one finds in institutional ‘assemblages’ is instead a 
complex arranging of spatial and temporal relations that connects together prisons, 
hospitals and local communities. Both staff and patients are put into patterns of 
circulation that reconfigure their life space. Bodies are arranged in the shifting space 
of the unit (which can narrow to locked wards or dilate to include the general hospital, 
other units and community visits). This work of arranging serves to surface a diverse 
range of propositions, some of which are contradictory – ‘she is doing better’, ‘he 
remains a danger to himself’, ‘right now things are more settled’. The stretching and 
compressing or ‘churn’ of relations creates a changeable affective atmosphere.  
 
In this chapter, we will explore how this folding of space and time is experienced by 
patients in secure care. The material we discuss here comes from a study of medium 
secure forensic mental health ward in a part of Greater London4. This is a ward for 																																																								4	Forensic	psychiatric	units	are	graded	from	‘low’	through	‘medium’	to	‘secure’.	
Secure	means	that	patients	are	not	able	to	leave	the	unit	without	the	agreement	of	
clinicians.	Whilst	there	are	only	three	high	security	units	in	England	–	Broadmoor,	
Ashworth	and	Rampton	–	medium	and	low	secure	units	are	maintained	by	every	
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where forensic psychiatric patients are detained or ‘sectioned’ for treatment under the 
Mental Health Act. These patients have committed an ‘index offence’ for which they 
have either been arrested, remanded or found guilty (Department of Health, 1983). 
Some patients have been transferred from prison, others have been referred directly to 
the unit. Detention on the ward typically lasts at least two years, and for around 1 in 5 
patients can be for between 5 to 10 years, and in some cases for between 10 to 20 
years or longer.  
 
Folding Space and Time on the Ward 
 
To understand how the reconfiguring of life space occurs in the institutional 
assemblage, it is important to explore the affordances of the physical setting of the 
ward. The invariant qualities of the setting constitute very particular kinds of potential 
experiences. In the unit where we conducted research, there are four wards, which 
housed patients at various stages of their treatment and rehabilitation. There are also a 
series of corridors, many leading to ‘airlock’ spaces, where one set of door is required 
to be locked before the next may be opened. Each ward has its own specific category 
of patients, ranging from acute patients who were severely distressed (mostly deemed 
psychotic), through to patients on a rehabilitation ward who appeared calm, and were 
mostly unsupervised. All patients are medicated, usually administered via depot 
injection5. On the rehabilitation ward, access to the community is gradually 
introduced, until some patients are permitted to leave the unit unaccompanied for 
several hours and even days at a time. Some of the patients we interviewed, therefore, 
had a less than clear delineation between hospital and community spaces.  
 
On the whole though, most patients are confined to a locked ward space, which had 
two or three communal spaces, including a television room, games room, bathrooms 																																																																																																																																																														
NHS	trust.	Medium	units	are	typically	co-located	with	general	hospitals.	Around	two	
thirds	of	units	use	single-sex	wards,	but	mixed-sexed	wards	are	found	in	the	
remaining	third	(Fleming,	2007).	The	work	we	have	conducted	has	been	on	single-
sex	wards.			5	A	depot	injection	is	a	method	of	delivering	anti-psychotic	medication	that	is	
administered	directly	into	large	muscle	tissue,	such	as	the	buttocks.	They	are	slow	
releasing	and	typically	last	up	to	six	weeks		
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and communal dining space. In the centre of these communal spaces is a nurse’s 
station, surrounded by glass and a locked door. To attract the attention of nurses 
outside of regular scheduled interaction, patients knock on the locked door or 
windows (this can be a source of routine conflict). For the majority of the time, nurses 
sit at computer stations, typing up notes on patient conduct and commenting on the 
presence or absence of ‘symptoms’ of mental illness. On the whole, there is little 
physical interaction between nursing staff and patients, except at points of 
disruption/crisis. To escape the daily low-level irritations of communal living in this 
relatively restricted environment, patients often spend time in their bedrooms, where 
they have access to music systems and occasionally a television linked up to a DVD 
player. Despite such means of retreat, however, staff have continual access to 
patients, and are able to ‘look in’ to bedrooms even late at night using window 
shutters controlled from the outside to enable regular observations6.  
 
Together, these physical features of the setting help to constitute the social topology 
of the ward. They do this by shaping what actions are permitted, and which become 
difficult to perform or impossible. For example, there is no place on the ward where a 
patient can be properly alone, without the possibility of observation, even whilst 
sleeping. The design of the unit clearly communicates propositions of containment 
and observation through locks, observational windows, bolted down chairs and tables 
(to prevent them being used as weapons). There is very little here that might offer a 
sense of ‘homeliness’ – no carpets or lamps or even toilet seats (which are removed, 
due to risk of self harm). Bedrooms are designed to remove anything that might serve 
as potential ligature points. Windows open only the slightest amount. There are no 
sharp corners on any of the furniture. It is difficult to mount posters or photographs on 
a bedroom wall because pins and blu-tack7 are banned in case of swallowing. The 
environment clearly proposes to patients that the principal concern of the unit is the 
management of risk.  
 
The discourse of risk animates all relationships on the unit. A common experience is 
for patients to be kept waiting until appropriate numbers of staff are available to 
																																																								6	See	Brown,	Reavey,	Kanyedrezi	&	Batty	(2014)	for	more	details.	7	Blu-tack	is	a	trademarked	name	for	low	adhesion	putty	
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supervise activities such as being taken for an appointment with a GP8. Particular 
times on the unit, such as meal times, are anticipated as being potential ‘flashpoints’. 
Staff tend to be especially vigilant at these times, and are prepared to intervene in 
minor disputes over portion size or availability of particular meals, before they flare 
up in significant conflict. However, the concern with risk also results in the 
emergence of unexpected practices. Since 2008, smoking has been banned in all 
National Health Service (NHS) buildings in England, including forensic psychiatric 
units. But the ban does not apply to prisons, from where many patients have been 
transferred9. This creates a dilemma for staff. The risks of having to manage the 
cravings of upset smokers is seen to outweigh those of organizing informal supervised 
‘smoking breaks’ outside the ward. Yet as this falls at the margins of common 
practice in the NHS, it falls to the on-duty nursing staff to unofficially timetable these 
escorted breaks. The calculation of risk affords novel interaction as well as 
constraining routine interaction. 
 
Staff and patients alike experience the social topology of the unit as having a distinct 
affective atmosphere. For example, the acoustics of the ward means that sound is 
accentuated in the areas where bedrooms are located. The relative quiet of the 
bedroom space is regularly punctuated by the sound of the clinking keys which staff 
are obliged to have attached to their belts. Noise is also a key sign that staff monitor 
to gauge the collective mood of patients – if the ward is either too quiet or too noisy, 
trouble is likely to be brewing. The desired atmosphere of the ward is one that is 
‘settled’. This translates as stability amongst the patient population (i.e. few new 
transfers), a relative absence of conflict between patients and with staff, and minimal 
displays of distress by individual patients. A similar language is inculcated amongst 
patients to describe their own psychological states. Being ‘well’ is what one ought to 
aspire towards. Contrary to the usual sense of the term, ‘wellness’ here means the 
ability to self-manage one’s own distress rather than an absence of ‘symptoms’. Being 																																																								8	A	General	Practitioner	(GP)	is	a	non-specialist	medical	doctor.	Patients	have	appointments	with	GPs	
for	routine	health	issues,	along	with	appointments	with	their	consulting	psychiatrists	and	clinical	
psychologists.	9	The	ban	on	smoking	on	secure	units	is	one	major	reason	why	some	patients	say	
they	would	actually	prefer	to	be	in	prison.	It	is	a	practical	and	symbolic	marker	of	
relative	lack	of	autonomy	on	the	unit	compared	to	the	penal	system.		
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able to display wellness is an important step towards being considered as in recovery, 
and hence closer to a review of one’s section.  
 
What is striking about the way that wellness is performed on the unit is that is does 
not require reference to the patient’s past experiences before they entered the unit. 
Whilst staff are certainly aware of the nature of the index offence that resulted in a 
patient being placed their current section, alongside their ‘history’ with the psychiatric 
and legal system, this is not deemed to be relevant to establishing wellness. What 
matters is how the patient has managed himself or herself since the moment when 
they entered the unit. Patients are not required to demonstrate a coming to terms with 
the index offence and the life circumstances that surrounded it, nor are they asked to 
reflect on the specific factors that may have contributed to them being given a formal 
psychiatric diagnosis. It is in this sense that the unit enacts a form of ‘institutional 
forgetting’. Life space is compressed to what happens on admission and what follows 
during the course of the patient’s section. Anything prior to that is not a primary 
matter of concern in the institutional project of managing ‘settled’ wards of ‘well’ 
patients.   
 
If life space is compressed by the social topology of the unit, then it also complexified 
in a range of ways. Despite the clear physical barriers on wards, life space does not 
map onto Euclidean or metric space, the relations through which patients feel and act 
cut across temporal and spatial remoteness. Take, for example, the relations between 
staff who administer psychotropic medication and patients. Medication is dispensed 
using two major techniques. The first is dispensing medication to be taken orally. 
Traditionally, this involved patients forming a queue on the ward to receive their 
specific batch of medication, which they would then swallow under the watchful gaze 
of nursing staff. However, the development of depot injections has rendered the 
interaction around medication as both more and less personal at the same time. To 
receive medication via this method, patients must partially expose their buttocks to a 
staff member, who delivers a deep-muscle injection. Once performed, there is no 
further need for staff to monitor the behaviour of the patient for compliance with their 
medication, as the medication remains active in the patient’s body for a number of 
weeks. Whilst depot injections greatly reduce the need for the physical presence of 
staff, we might say that the relationship of compliance remains active, mediated 
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through the patient’s very veins. The relations between staff and patients are enacted 
through direct intervention at the biochemical level, as well as through ongoing 
physical interaction.  
 
The spatial relations that are constituted by the ward seem to unfold in all manner of 
different directions. Despite the locked doors, various features of the world beyond 
the physical limits of wards are part of the relationships on the unit. One patient, for 
example, explained how his interactions with staff could be severely affected by what 
he perceived to be the member of staff’s “domestic troubles”. Whatever was 
occurring in the space of the staff member’s home was felt to travel with them to the 
ward, shaping the relations that were enacted there. Another patient felt the 
inequalities between themselves and staff intensely. They described how staff were 
able to leave the ward at the close of each day, to return to ‘a wife or husband, and 
find relief and support there’, whereas patients had no such alternate space in which to 
retreat. 
 
The boundaries of the unit are porous; the supposed ‘outside’ is continuously being 
folded into relations on the ward. When patients reach the point in their recovery 
where they are allowed to make community visits, their movements back and forth 
from the ward create perturbations. At a mundane level, staff are concerned with the 
possibility of contraband items, such as illicit drugs, pornography or mobile phones, 
being brought back into the unit. But in terms of the affective atmosphere of the ward, 
patients also bring back stories of their experiences whilst back in the community – 
social occasions, sexual encounters, what it is to have autonomy again. These stories 
become threaded into relations between patients, who are able to vicariously place 
themselves outside the locked doors of the unit through the sharing of the experiences 
of community visits.  
 
The examples so far suggest that the life spaces of patients expand beyond the 
physical limits of the unit, but only in a relatively limited way into local communities. 
But if we consider the diverse mixture of elements that are brought together in the 
institutional assemblage, it begins to appear that the churn of relations has far greater 
reach. Many of the nursing staff working on these particular wards are migrants from 
East and West Africa, who have brought their skills and background to working in the 
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NHS. The effects of migration, movements between societies, the conflicts and 
accommodations involved in working across different social and cultural settings, can 
enter into relations on the ward. Conversely, many of the psychiatrists and other 
clinicians working on the unit come from a class and social background that is 
significantly removed from that of the patients. There are a variety of historical and 
cultural experiences that are all in play together here, acting to deform and reshape the 
social topology of the unit. These can come together in ways that have significant 
effects on the lives of patients. Black men, for example, especially those with larger 
body sizes, appear to be treated as presenting greater risks than other patients, which 
is reflected in calculations about medication levels. Female patients relationships with 
male patients are viewed almost entirely from the perspective of possible predation 
and exploitation by staff (See Brown, Reavey, Kanyeredzi & Batty, 2014).  
 
The unit itself also has a history. One can see the changing patterns of practice around 
mental health care written into the very shape of the building. Older wards tend to be 
more cramped – ‘rabbit runs’ – with a focus of maximizing the amount of bed space 
and keeping all non-essential facilities off the ward itself. Newer wards reflect the 
priorities of the ‘care in the community’ policy, where secure psychiatric care is seen 
as a short-term last resort option. Contemporary ward designs tend to place greater 
emphasis on communal spaces, including outdoor spaces, in order to foster the kind of 
social integration required during the transition back into living in the community. 
Moreover, secure psychiatric units tend to have a well-embedded reputation and 
historical character amongst the local communities in which they are sited. These are 
places that engender curiosity, humour and fear in equal measures. Patients may 
themselves have spoken of or joked about the site long before being transferred to the 
unit on a section.  
 
At the heart, then, of the secure unit is the paradox of an assemblage that has a 
distinctive historical formation and which draws together highly diverse spatial and 
temporal relations, but which is, nevertheless, focused on discounting and actively 
forgetting the past experiences of the patients around which it is constituted. The 
space of the ward operates somewhat outside of conventional temporal systems. On 
one hand, experiences on the ward are regimented by standard institutional time, such 
as meals, medical consultations and ward rounds, washing and perhaps the occasional 
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group activity. And yet, time on the ward is indeterminate, to such an extent that 
patients feel as if time passes without any clear demarcation, where literally, the ward 
is simply a time of containment, which they move through in a structureless fashion, 
without a clear sense of when this perpetual presenteeism will end10.  
 
Categories of Thought 
 
In How Institutions Think, the anthropologist Mary Douglas offers an account of how 
the forms of social solidarity that we think of as ‘institutions’ emerge and develop. 
She points in particular to the way in which institutions draw upon systems of 
classification, or ways of naming and ordering the world, over which they then claim 
ownership. Often this is done, she claims, by using an overarching analogy with some 
aspect of the natural world, such that the classification system comes to seem timeless 
and immutable. Ideas that fit this framework tend to be preserved; those that do not 
are rendered problematic and disruptive. Douglas goes on to assert that: 
 
Any institution … starts to control the memory of its members; it causes them 
to forget experiences incompatible with its righteous image, and it brings to 
their minds events which sustain the view of nature that is complementary to 
itself. It provides the categories of their thought, sets the terms for self-
knowledge, and fixes identities (Douglas, 1987: 112) 
 
To become a member of an institution – either willingly or unwillingly – is to find 
oneself bound, to some degree, by the categories and ways of thinking that it 
enshrines. The identity that is subsequently conferred upon persons by virtue of their 
membership shapes their self-knowledge. One becomes the sort of person who is 
made over in the image of the institution. One starts to think as the institution thinks. 
Past experiences are then reconstructed and organized to fit with the patterns that are 
validated by the institutional framework. And one active forgets those experiences 
that are ‘incompatible with its righteous image’. In this way, institutions ‘take charge’ 
of memory. 																																																								10In	the	UK,	patients	who	enter	an	NHS	facility	through	the	criminal	justice	system	
can	be	detained	indefinitely,	through	regular	reviews	of	their	section,	if	they	are	
deemed	to	be	a	risk	to	society,	due	to	their	mental	state		
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Douglas’ account puts us on the way to understanding both how and why the 
institutional assemblage requires patients to engage in active forgetting. One aspect of 
the assemblage is the set of codes and categories it deploys to make sense of what it 
does. These are the diagnostic categories of forensic mental health, such as 
Personality Disorder (PD) and Schizophrenia. Critical scholars of mental health 
practices such as Richard Bentall and Mary Boyle have shown in painstaking detail 
exactly how these kinds of categories are culturally and historical contingent, and the 
nature of the kind of work which goes into sustaining them, rather than exploring 
alternative accounts of mental health and distress11. But in relation to the unit, it is 
important to recognize that for practical purposes these kinds of categories are taken 
to have an independent, natural existence that serves to ground the work that goes on 
in the wards. As evidence of this, it is common to hear patients referred to purely in 
terms of diagnostic labels – a ‘PD patient’, ‘Psychosis patient’ etc.  
 
These categories form the basis for how the institution thinks and are the source of 
membership for patients. If one cannot be labeled by this classification system, then 
really one has no place on the unit (with the likely outcome of being transferred back 
into the prison system). It is a peculiar feature of how these diagnostic categories are 
defined that they require little reference to autobiographical memory. For example, a 
diagnosis of Personality Disorder can be made based on current feelings (e.g. fear of 
being left alone), recent behaviour (e.g. personally damaging impulsive activities) and 
general self-perception (e.g. disconnected from one’s thoughts). Very little of this 
requires the person being assessed to offer an account of specific past experiences. In 
fact, when we interviewed patients they often commented that this was one of the first 
occasions when they had been invited to discuss their life experiences. In the 
following, one of the researchers (R) asks the patient (P) their feelings about the 
interview they had just completed: 
 
R How do you think the interview went? 
P  Yeah. Yeah, I think the first bit was the hardest thing 																																																								11	See	Bentall	2004	and	Boyle	1990.	For	an	overview	of	how	one	might	systematically	think	alternative	
perspectives	in	mental	health,	including	service	user	perspectives,	see	Cromby,	Harper	&	Reavey,	
2013	
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R Yeah (laughs) 
P Like tell me about yourself, I’ve never really done that before 
(laughs)… I wasn’t used to that, no-one’s ever asked me.  
 
It can seem extraordinary to people unfamiliar with mental health assessment that 
‘talking about yourself’ is not central to the practice. But this is because the categories 
which structure how this particular institution thinks are concerned with patterns of 
thought, feeling and action which are considered to have a clear, independent 
existence that transcends any particular occasion – that is to say, it is not necessary to 
hear about any life event in particular in order to make a diagnosis (see Cromby, 
Harper & Reavey, 2013). Moreover, in forensic psychiatric care, the recent behaviour 
of the person being assessed is already a matter of (criminal) record. The institution 
does not need to hear the life story of the prospective patient to make a decision on 
whether to admit them or not. 
 
If past life experiences are not particularly relevant during the process of initial 
assessment, then they become even less so once the person has been admitted as a 
patient to the unit. Many patients in forensic psychiatric care can recall very difficult 
histories, often involving experiences of neglect and physical and sexual abuse. 
Addressing such issues is not part of the remit of the unit, whose primary concern is 
rather with the stabilization of symptoms of poor mental health. In part, this is 
because the working institutional assumption is that the kinds of mental issues that are 
seen in forensic psychiatric care are life-long conditions, which can be managed but 
are never ‘cure-able’ in the usual sense of that term. This can be a source of distress to 
patients, who do perceive their experiences as being directly relevant to their current 
mental well-being and self-esteem: 
 
Sometimes you tell them things [the staff] and they don’t give a shit about it 
[the patient here is referring to an alleged sexual assault by a staff member]. 
It’s probably like being on trial. You have told one of the doctors, the junior 
doctors, and she just said to me, I can’t really do nothing about it because it 
was in the past, in the past and we are here now.  
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The major practices and ‘categories of thought’ operating within the unit aim at 
stabilisation of patients within the present, rather than facilitating access to the past or 
establishing its present relevance. What is of course absent from this current project 
of stabilisation is its continually mediation by the temporal and spatial complexities 
we have discussed so far. For example, the space of the ward which serves as the 
environment for patients, folds within it relations from beyond its own physical 
boundaries, including the home spaces and intimate relations of the staff. Whilst 
considerations of what has happened outside the unit are not deemed relevant in 
understanding a patient’s current ‘wellness’, patients claim that matter such as their 
confidence, behaviour and self-esteem are all affected by this folding-in of outside 
relations: 
 
Um (…) I suppose looking at it maybe they’ve [i.e. staff members] had a fight 
at home, or they’ve had an argument with their wife, or whatever, they haven’t 
paid the bill or whatever, they’ve had financial difficulty. They bring their 
emotions onto the ward, and they take it out on the patients, you know, you 
know they like they shout at you and talk to you like you’re an animal, you’re 
a third class person … it makes you, you feel like, it makes you feel like 
you’re unworthy, you’re not worth anything, you know. If you’re trying to 
build up confidence because that’s how you’ve felt before, you’re trying to 
build your self-esteem and stay focused and try to make a life for yourself, you 
know, it’s just makes you feel despondent.  
 
Topologically speaking, even though the home spaces of staff are remote, they are 
still present and formative in the affective landscape of the patient (and staff). The 
project of ‘wellness’, which involves being able to display control over things such as 
self-esteem, is interrupted by relations on the ward, which are in turn shaped by 
relational vectors from the ‘outside’. It seems that whilst temporal and spatial 
relations beyond the ward are deemed irrelevant for assessing wellness, they are 
continuously entering into the life space of patients via their interaction with staff. Or 
put slightly differently, the institutional assemblage is porous and leaky with regard to 
its management of relations. But this cannot formally acknowledged, creating a 
paradox that is not lost upon patients: you want me to be well by focusing only on the 
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present but you ignore how that present is being continuously pushed and pulled by 
forces from the outside.  
 
Corporeal Transformations 
 
If one aspect of the institutional assemblage is the deployment of categories of 
thought that constitute a ‘regime of forgetting’ focused on maintaining ‘wellness’, 
then the other is the organization of bodies and corporeal relations on the unit. What 
we see here is the way that patient bodies become groupings within the institututional 
assemblage that are mediated by psychotropic medication. Patients on the unit are 
normally required to take a range of medication, ranging from ‘typical’ and ‘atypical’ 
anti-psychotic treatment to drugs for depression and anxiety, along with other 
medication for managing side-effects and physical symptoms12. Medication can be 
experienced in wide range of ways, depending on the individual concerned. Anti-
psychotics, for example, may lessen feelings of paranoia or hearing voices, but they 
can also bring about restlessness, sleepiness, felt slowness of thinking, sexual 
dysfunction, dizziness and excess saliva.  
 
In this way, the body can act as site of transformation, where new ways of relating to 
oneself are constituted. We call these novel self-relations Psychologically Modified 
Experiences (PMEs). Using an analogy with Genetically Modified Organisms 
(GMOs), we have argued elsewhere that forensic psychiatric care reformulates 
experiences from the existing ‘experience-ecology’. For example, prior to entering 
care, patients may have had varied and diverse experiences around sexuality. But on 
the unit itself, patients are encouraged to view sexuality as either something that must 
be entirely ‘left behind’ or as inherently risky and potentially comprising to 
‘wellness’. This reshaping of what sexuality is and what it can mean is further 
compounded by anti-psychotic medication, which can leave patients feeling estranged 
from themselves as sexual beings – as one of the patients put it ‘this place has 
amputated my sexuality’ (Brown, Reavey, Kanyeredzi & Batty, 2014: 250). Patients 
then come to experience a very different version of sexuality from that which they 
have known before. PMEs are constituted as novel experiences which combine 																																																								12	Clozapine	is	the	dominant	form	of	anti-psychotic	medication	used	in	secure	care	
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elements that are both highly concrete (e.g. sexual feelings, bodily sensations) and 
highly abstract (e.g. discourses of risk and predation, the need to present oneself as 
‘well’). Having been adopted during the course of secure care, PMEs remain with 
patients as part of their efforts to demonstrate ‘wellness’ once they return to 
community based care. 
 
As an institutional assemblage, the unit both organises bodies, placing them into 
particular temporal and spatial relations with one another, and organises through 
bodies, by acting directly on the feelings and experiences of patients, in part through 
direct intervention in their biological states. How the patient moves through the ward 
and hospital space is marked by both the invariant structures of the physical space, 
and through the corporeal affordances created by the medication. The felt sense of 
detachment from the past that patients experience comes as much from this 
organizing of bodies as it does from discursive practices of discounting prior 
experience. There can be, of course, direct cognitive impacts of medication that may 
impair memory. For instance, we have found in our work that ‘settled’ patients taking 
antipsychotics are rarely able to sustain a conversation in a research interview beyond 
30-45 minutes. However, our particular interest here is on the experiential and felt 
sense of the past being literally displaced via the operations of medication upon the 
body and subsequent enactments in time and space. One of the major ways in which a 
separation between the past and present is created and sustained is through literal 
transformations in the shape and functioning of the body. Patients reported this with 
some regularity:  
 
When I was on Clozapine, I put on a lot of weight. And the thing is I hate 
about Clozapine is that people really like just go on and on about it. But it’s 
not all that you know. With me, it had such bad side effects … My heart 
beated really fast. It was like 130. You know, I was always drooling. I was 
tired a lot. You know, I slept a lot. I put on a lot of weight, you know. I went 
from size 12 to 22 and I’m still a 22 and I’m trying to lose weight.  
 
Changes to the body were largely reported to be unpleasant and anxiety inducing, 
physiologically (rapid heart-beat) and psychologically (tiredness and weight gain). 
Female patients expressed particular concern about weight gain. Entry into the unit 
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involved not just a loss of liberty, but also a loss of control over one’s body-image. 
Gaining significant amounts of weight acted as a very visible marker of the 
transformation to one’s identity brought about by being sectioned. The past is here 
directly indexed to one’s physical appearance before being transferred, and the lack of 
any subsequent significant development during time on the ward – ‘I went from a size 
12 to 22 and I’m still a 22’. Many patients commented on their ‘past self’ being lost to 
a newly modified self, brought about by changes to the body, and subsequently mood. 
This was sometimes thought to be irreversible and hence problematic. But it could 
also be recuperated by taking ownership of the discourse of ‘wellness’, such as in the 
following: 
 
but I must admit the medication has helped me over the years, just calmed me 
down a lot … my moods stabilized as well with that. But I will say I am not 
the same person I was 22 years ago. I’ve changed completely. And the 
medication has helped me, you know, it has helped me really. 
 
Here ideas of being ‘stable’ and ‘settled’ are used to reformulate the loss of former 
self. Being ‘not the same person’ is presented as a positive transformation. 
 
Medication also heightens the stretching of temporal relations on the ward. Patients 
described a slowing down of time in general, due to fatigue. This can be clearly seen 
when one enters a ward on the unit. Patients tend to move slowly, often without clear 
purpose, and may at times simply lie on the floor. Many describe an alteration in their 
perception of time, feeling as though their ‘body clock’ no longer operated as it once 
did. As one patient remarked:  
 
I sleep during the day, and am awake during the night. My body doesn’t know 
what it’s doing. The way I was before doesn’t resemble what I’m doing now at 
all. It’s weird. 
 
If the invariant physical structure of the ward itself offers few opportunities to 
structure the day, beyond occasional routine appointments, then the effects of 
medication act further complexify the sense of time passing. For the most part, 
patients are left to make their own choices about where they wish to spend the day in 
	 19	
the relatively restricted space of the ward. Typically this makes for an irregular 
pattern of sleeping, interacting with others, eating and watching television. Some 
patients describe this as retreating between their bedroom and communal areas, with 
no real comfort to be found in either space – you stay with others until it becomes too 
much, you be by yourself until you can handle it no longer. Time unfolds through this 
alternation without purpose.  
 
The discourse of ‘wellness’ and ‘settled’ wards finds its counterpart in an ordering of 
patients as docile bodies, whose movements and patterns of activity are fairly stable. 
For patients, this means that control over their own bodies comes to be seen as 
emblematic of finding a way beyond the immediate boundaries of the unit. For 
example, in the following one of the researchers asks a patient how she manages to 
deal with the interactional difficulties of life on the ward: 
 
R You said … over here you found it quite difficult because you 
remember certain things that people said that were prejudiced. But it 
does sound quite difficult ... how do you cope with that difficulty? ... 
What sort of things do you focus on? 
P  Well, getting out, losing weight, growing my hair, just having a future, 
like things I want to do in the future.  
 
The ‘future’ the patient envisages here involves a return to a past physical state. For 
this woman, growing her hair back to its original state and losing the weight she had 
gained on medication signified a prior sense of self, and a felt sense of agency. In this 
way, connecting with both the past and the future seems to directly mediated by 
taking control of embodiment – if I can get back to how I used to look, I will become 
again the person I was before I came here. The way out of the regime of forgetting is 
through the self-relation to the body. But it is not easy to find the means to be able to 
work on this self-relation, since the experiences that pre-date admission have been 
overlaid with PMEs. In the next extract, a patient describes how his relationship to 
medication and his body has changed during her time on the unit: 
 
P [the medication means] I’m tired all the time 
R Mm 
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P So, I don’t know, if its normal, but I guess it is normal but that’s one 
thing like, that I don’t really like it all really… Because I used to be 
much more active than I am now. 
R Hm, mm 
P And mm, I just haven’t got the strength you need to like do exercise 
and stuff like that you know. 
R God and did you talk about these side effects with your Doctor? 
P Yeah, I mentioned it a few times … Now here’s the funny thing about 
it, is that I, I, I could just laugh about it up until about 3 years ago, I 
said this about 4 years ‘cos I’ve been away for a long time you know 
… I said to him, I used to go to the gym … then after that I’d go 
swimming, and skipping and he’s like ‘you’ve past your peak’, and 
I’m like (young) ... Do I don’t know, I, I I I feel really frustrated if I 
couldn’t get out and do stuff, so I just smoke instead. 
 
In this reporting of a doctor-patient interaction, the patient talks about his past active 
self being replaced by a tired and inactive version. For the patient, this is entirely 
attributable to the side-effects of medication, since, as he puts, ‘I’m like young’. The 
comment he reports the doctor as making – ‘you’ve past your peak’ – is then double 
edged. On the one hand, it could be interpreted as simple reference to the patient’s 
age, since as he himself acknowledges, ‘I’ve been away for a long time’. But it seems 
more likely that this comment points to a shared knowledge between doctor and 
patient that ageing works differently in secure care. Long-term anti-psychotic 
medication can accelerate the development of many physical markers usually 
associated with ageing, such as high blood pressure, stiffness and shaking, diabetes. 
Patients in secure care can also develop problems with the teeth and gums, through 
lack of care and dietary issues. When this is taken together with weight gain and a 
general lack of exercise, patients can both look and feel ‘past their prime’ at a far 
earlier chronological age than would be expected. So whilst patients are suspended in 
a present that allows little reference to past or future, their bodies may be marking out 
time at an excessive rate. Small wonder that when confronted with this realization that 
he will never be able to return to both the body and the self of the man he was before 
secure care, this patient decides to ‘just smoke instead’.   
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Some patients make direct links between these kinds of transformation to the body 
through medication and being unable to remember what their body can do at basic 
level, in terms of activities such as eating, moving and being sexual. This results in a 
changing relationship to self: 
 
P They want to … you’ve got … Yeah because I’m on medication, I 
can’t sleep, yeah, you don’t feel like eating, you don’t feel like going 
to the gym, you don’t feel like exercising, you know, but that’s not 
what it should be like, you – you look after yourself, for the girls and 
you know that, but we don’t have that … you can’t do that no more … 
we’ve got that – you don’t have, you don’t understand what sex is 
anymore. 
R Right … Could you tell me a bit more about that, that you don’t 
understand what sex is. What you mean you sort of forget about it, or? 
P Yeah 
R Right, OK 
P It’s like a (a drug) Yeah … making you work a lot of the time, work a 
lot of the time, you know … And they can’t see, yeah. Obviously don’t 
understand, but it changes, it does change the way you see contact, you 
know, it changes, your personality changes. So it changes after that – a 
long time off them and it changes … Because I don’t really have 
thoughts (sexual), you know what I mean, you know, that, I can’t 
appreciate it any more 
 
As this patient describes it, sexuality was previously integral to how he related to his 
own body because ‘you look after yourself, for the girls’. Once the possibility of 
sexual expression has been removed following his transfer to the secure care, he 
begins to neglect his body, a process that is intensified by the de-motivating effects of 
medication. This leaves him the situation of feeling displaced in relation to his own 
embodiment – ‘you don’t understand what sex is anymore’. Sexuality belongs with 
the person he was before. In his current state, he no longer experiences sexual 
thoughts, he has become estranged from that physical aspect of what he was. Another 
patient describes this process of corporeal displacement directly as ‘forgetting’: 
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R Okay (…) So have you been able to continue feeling and being sexual 
while you’ve been here? 
P No … Well, I I don’t plan, I don’t really think of sex a lot, I don’t even 
know if I remember how to do it, I’ve forgotten how to do it 
 
If sexuality belongs to a past that is neither relevant nor entirely thinkable in terms of 
the discursive practices and ordering of bodies on the unit, then it may, perhaps, be 
ceded to a future that lies after the ending of the section, on return to the community. 
But as this patient describes it, the displacement or forgetting of that aspect of one’s 
embodiment makes it difficult to imagine how one could resume life as a sexual being 
– ‘I’ve forgotten how to do it’. The discounting of past experiences and feelings here 
seems to set up a future where even if the patient does leave the ward, they will be, in 
a sense, stuck in the ‘presentism’ that it inculcates. It is this sense of the irreversible 
nature of the transformations that occur in terms of one’s relation to oneself that 
seems most troubling to patients:  
 
I would say this place has amputated my sexuality.  Definitely, it’s – it’s not 
my home, it’s not – it’s not a free environment and (...) it’s a – it’s so anti-life.  
I just don’t even think about sexuality in here and I grieve over that quite a lot.  
And (...) I try and cope with this place on its own terms, you know and 
whatever it has to offer me I will engage with. So and try to make it a reality, 
its own reality but I still can’t feel human enough to be a sexual being in this 
environment. 
 
We read this extract as a description of what can happen to the life space of the 
patient when it absorbed into the ordering practices of the ward. This patient focuses 
in particular on the lack of private space and restricted movement. She uses the phrase 
‘anti-life’ to sum up her feeling. Everything here seems corrosive of the vitality of 
living. She has become estranged from the feelings and experiences that made her the 
person she was. She is now a body without a past and, apparently, with little sense of 
the future. 
 
Conclusion 
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The provision of secure psychiatric care has undergone dramatic changes in the past 
half-century. The ‘grand asylums’ which Foucault saw as means by which ‘madness’ 
became enclosed in the disciplinary architecture of modernity have been replaced by 
more supple and distributed networks of care and concern, where secure 
environments constitute only a small part. We have used the notion of assemblage to 
explore the heterogeneous composition of these very particular institutional settings. 
Our focus has been on the emergent modes of ordering time and space that occur on 
secure forensic psychiatric unit. Here, temporal as well as spatial folding occurs, such 
that patients are caught up in what amounts to a ‘regime of forgetting’, where 
‘wellness’ and stabilization of mental health are paramount. 
 
And yet, like all assemblages, there are tensions and discontinuities in how the unit 
works. The end point of secure care is reached when the patient is deemed suitably 
settled to be able to return to the community. But the corporeal transformations that 
are required to adapt to life on the unit may leave patients singularly unsuited to 
community care. The relation to oneself as a sexual being, for example, is interrupted 
by both medication and by the overarching discourse of risk. Sexuality is transformed 
into what we have termed a ‘psychologically modified experience’ – a form of 
experience that is shaped by the discursive practices of psychiatry. It is not simply the 
case that patients are left bearing the marks of institutional life. It is rather that the 
institution disrupts the capacity to make coherence between a past and a future life at 
a vital, corporeal level of experience.  
 
This invites an immediate response: so what? Secure forensic psychiatric units are 
scarcely the only institutions to mould and shape those who find themselves within 
them.  Prisons, hospitals, schools and factories arguably do much the same. Why 
should life on the secure unit be any different? The answer is that historically this 
institutional assemblage provisionally exists merely as a site of experimentation for 
techniques that will render its continuing existence as redundant. There is, within both 
psychiatric discourse and contemporary public policy literally no future for secure 
psychiatric care. It remains in place only as a stop-gap until more effective methods of 
community care can be evolved. So here is the paradox. An institution that serves as a 
vehicle for de-institutionalization but which operates, at a deep corporeal and 
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psychological level, as a route to re-institutionalization. Now that is something that 
really demands our critical engagement and reflection. 
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Abstract 
 
Secure forensic psychiatric care can be approached as an ‘institutional assemblage’. 
In place of the old ‘grand asylums’, modern units are emergent spaces of care and 
security that consist of heterogeneous and contradictory sets of elements. Secure units 
enact a folding of time and space, despite their porous boundaries and extensions into 
the community. Patients live a ‘suspended life’ where their past experiences are 
deemed irrelevant to the stabilization of their current condition. This institutes a 
‘regime of forgetting’ based around recoding experience into the categories of thought 
of psychiatric discourse. The outcome is a changed self-relation in the form of a 
corporeal transformation, where the ability to create coherence between past and 
future experience is disrupted.  
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